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and verbal, and the descriptive detail of its scholarly essays create an illusion
of projecting the reader into Behrens's time and encourage independent evaluation of the AEG experiment. An adequate index and an exhaustive bibliography of primary and secondary sources complement a book that is designed
and printed in a manner handsomely appropriate to its subject. Buddensieg
and his associates succeed in portraying Behrens as a designer and architect
whose work holds significance for the history of twentieth-century art, business, and technology.

Jeffrey L. Meikle is assistant professor of American studies and art history at
the University of Texas, Austin. He is the author of Twentieth Century Limited: Industrial Design in America, 1925-1939 (1979). At present, he is working on a cultural history of plastics in America.

The Dragon and the Iron Horse: The Economics of Railroads in China, 18761937. By Ralph William Huenemann. (Cambridge: The Council on East
Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984. xii + 347 pp. $20.00.)
Reviewed by Lillian M. Li
The history of railroads in China before the establishment of the People's
Republic in 1949 was fraught with difficulties of various kinds. In comparison
with India or Russia, China was distinctly late in developing railways. In the
late nineteenth century, railways met formidable opposition from many high
officials, who feared not only the foreign influence that railways would permit,
but also the threat they posed to traditional social customs and economic interests. China's first railroad, the ten-mile Shanghai-Woosung line-built in
1876 by foreign engineers and dismantled the following year under orders from
Chinese officials-was the most famous example of obstructionism. Not until
the turn of the century were China's first major trunk lines laid and controversy over foreign financing of railroads became a key element in the events
leading up to the revolution of 1911. In the warlord and nationalist period
before 1937, rail construction continued, but the efficient functioning of railroads met interference from warlord and other armies. Following the war with
Japan and the civil war, the new government of the People's Republic paid
great attention to restoring and expanding the rail system, but although the
volume of traffic is heavy today, China's rail mileage (track length) remains
conspicuously low for a nation of its size and population.
In The Dragon and the Iron Horse: The Economics of Railroads in China,
1876-1937, Ralph William Huenemann has given us the first formal economic
analysis in any language of the development of Chinese railways. Drawing on
both Chinese and English-language sources, Huenemann has fashioned a rigorous analysis of railway development, centering on the question of whether
foreign imperialism deprived China of the economic benefits of the railways.
Since his treatment is formidably complex, a brief summary of the chapters
may be in order.
Chapter 1 discusses the measurement of the economic benefit of railroads
in the broadest theoretical terms. Drawing from, and elaborating on, economic
and theoretical studies of American railways, Huenemann argues that even if
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all the empirical data one desired were available, it would still be impossible
to measure economic benefit because tastes are essentially "nonhomothetic."
He concludes, "We shall never have a satisfactory measure of the impact of
railroads on aggregate Chinese income. Even with the benefit of hindsight we
do not know-indeed probably cannot know-whether the railroads were economically beneficial. Those who confidently claim to know the answer have
never adequately understood the question" (p. 31). Although this laying of the
cards on the table-and Huenemann has some very good cards to play-shows
uncharacteristic candor for an economist, it has the unfortunate effect of undermining the force of the analysis subsequently presented.
After succinctly reviewing the history of railway development in Chapter 2,
Huenemann proceeds in Chapter 3, "Skinning the Ox Twice," to examine the
question of whether foreign imperialists who invested in Chinese railways
were exploiting the Chinese. Giving careful attention to different definitions
of the term exploitation, Huenemann concludes that the Chinese ox was not
skinned twice. Drawing on the work of Carl Riskin, he asserts that Chinese
capital was available, but that the returns on railway bonds did not represent
an attractive investment for Chinese investors. Hence, foreign capital invested
in Chinese railways represented a net gain for China, not a displacement of
Chinese capital.
In Chapter 4, the author uses data on Chinese railways in the period 191625 to resume a theoretical econometric discussion of whether railways are subject to economies of scale. He concentrates on some of the particular features
of railways that make their costs difficult to analyze; among these are the fact
that a railroad is a multiproduct firm, the variable of changing terrain, and the
problem of "lumpiness." Despite these difficulties, Huenemann asserts that
Chinese railways did exhibit economies of scale, and therefore the fact that
railways were subsidized should not be taken as a sign of their failure. "As
technocrats, we should not pander to the policymaker's appetite for false assurance .... There is, indeed, no such thing as an exact or 'true' estimate of
railway costs" (p. 174).
Chapter 5 focuses on the financing of the railways, and whether they were
indeed financially profitable for the investors. A host of problems besieged
Chinese railways, especially in the south, so that by the 1930s almost all national railways were insolvent. There was great diversity in the performance
of railways, however, and in any case, Huenemann cautions, "financial performance is not the same thing as economic performance" (p. 218).
The final chapter turns to the question of economic benefits. Using the
model developed in the first chapter, Huenemann tentatively concludes that
at least in the 1930s the net economic benefit to China from foreign investment
was "considerable." Nevertheless, he is careful to show the difficulty of measuring such benefits and the inadequacy of any mathematical model to measure
a complex historical reality.
Such a cursory summary does not do justice to the book, for imbedded in
each chapter are meticulously researched and incisively reasoned discussions
of important subtopics, such as the impact of fluctuating exchange rates, the
changing terms of trade for China, competition with water transport, and
so on.
This book then makes two distinct contributions and in a sense addresses
two different audiences. On the one hand, it presents a highly theoretical and
sophisticated methodology for measuring costs and benefits in railways. While
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this reviewer is not qualified to evaluate the econometric value of Heunemann's models, it seems clear that they represent important innovation and
that his analysis of Chinese railways should have not only a comparative but
also a theoretical importance for economists and economic historians of railways. The issues he raises should not be ignored by those whose interests in
railways elsewhere parallel his in China.
On the other hand, in the field of Chinese history, this book constitutes a
formidable refutation of the common view that railways represented an extreme form of economic exploitation of China by foreigners. While his views
will anger many, and Huenemann may be ranked with the "Harvard school"
of apologetics for imperialism in China, those who oppose his view will have
difficulty arguing with him on his own terms. He has raised the level of debate
from polemic to scholarship. Those who seek easy and comfortable conclusions
will also be dissatisfied with his circumspection, for he has used heavy artillery
to derive an honest, but necessarily weak, conclusion.
It is this reviewer's hope, however, that rather than rekindling the debate
on economic imperialism, Huenemann's book will allow it to be set aside and
clear the way for study of a host of other important questions about railroads
in China: for example, analysis of their differential impact on regional economies, or further investigation of the competition between rail and water
routes, or a comparison of Indian and Chinese railways and their effects on
economic development. To voice this hope is in no way to imply that Huenemann should have written a different book: it is more to express the wish that
he or someone else will write a second volume.

Lillian M. Li is associate professor of history at Swarthmore College. She is
the author of China's Silk Trade: Traditional Industry in the Modern World,
1842-1937 ( 1981 ). Her current research focuses on food supply, famine, and
water control in northern China since the early eighteenth century.

The Politics of Canadian-Japanese Economic Relations, 1952-1983. By Frank
Langdon. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983. xiii + 180
pp. $18.95.)
Reviewed by H. V. Nelles
Among industrialized countries Canada's problem with Japan must be
unique: a positive trade balance. Since 1922 Canada has consistently sold more
goods to Japan than it has bought in return. Nevertheless, in recent years
Canadians have not been entirely satisfied with this state of affairs, and at times
the dialogue between the two countries has sounded much like that between
the United States and Japan.
Canada's complaint has been twofold: first that Japanese imports have devastated certain sectors of Canadian domestic manufacturing (a familiar European and U.S. refrain), and second that Japan merely buys raw materials with
little value added attached but sells finished products. In recent years Japan
has bought Canadian coal, minerals, woodpulp, rapeseed, lumber, and wheat;
its principal exports, on the other hand, have been automobiles, electronic
equipment, photographic goods, trucks, tractors, and other motor vehicles.
For more than a decade, therefore, the Canadian government has waged a

